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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
----000000000---MARK T . HAYWOOD,

Plaintiff
Case No. 17373

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Defendant

----000000000---BRIEF OF APPELLANT
----000000000---STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On December 7, 1979, the claimant filed a request to reopen
his claim for unemployment benefits with the Industrial Commission.
On this claim he stated that his last employer was Gibbons & Reed
and that his last period of employment was from June 4, 1979, to
October 19, 1979.

The evidence, however, indicated that the

claimant worked for Monroe from October 22, 1979, to December 5,
1979.
The claimant received 18 weekly payments in the amount of
$89.00 each for a total of $1,602.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
on August 21, 1979, the Appeals Referee, Industrial Coromission
of Utah, Department of Employment Security found:

(1) that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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claimant had voluntarily left his employment with Monroe Without
good cause;

(2)

that the claimant had knowingly withheld infor::,•

concerning the circumstances of his leaving Monroe in order to
obtain benefits to which he was not entitled; and (3) that the
claimant had knowingly withheld information concerning his work
and earnings during the week ending December 8,

1·979.

On the basis of these findings of fact the appeals
referee held that the claimant had been overpaid in the amount
of $3, 204.
On September 25,

1979, the Appeals Board,

Industrial

Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, upheld
the decision of the Appeals Referee.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Claimant seeks to have the amount of the "overpayment
reduced from $3, 204 to $1, 691.

In the alternative the claimant

seeks to have this matter remanded to the appeals referee for
additional findings of fact.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 13,

1979, the claimant filed a claim for unemployito:

benefit with the Department of Employment Security.
receiving any benefits he found another job.

Before

The claimant worke:

for Gibbons & Reed from June 4, 1979, until October 19, 1979.
On October 22,

1979, the claimant obtained employment with Monrc:

on December 5, 19 79, the claimant walked off his job at
Monroe.

The incident that precipitated his walking off the job

·
' s re f usa 1 to let hi· m leave work early to do
was his supervisor
some Christmas shopping when he had let other employees leave
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered2by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

early, on other occasions, to do their Christmas shopping.

The

testimony also indicated that the claimant was bothered by a
number of other problems at the job.
The claimant's testimony also indicated that a refusal
to work overtime may have been involved but the appeals referee
did not go into this issue.

The claimant testified that he left

work at 4:30 or 5:00 P.M. and that the supervisor wanted him to
stay and work on a job that would not start for two or three hours.
The claimant testified that after cooling down he called
his supervisor the next morning and asked him whether he wanted
him to come to work and was told, "No, you walked off the job."
Exhibit 5, which is a report of work and earning from .
Monroe, indicates that claimant worked for Monroe on December 3,
4 and 5, 1979.

Exhibit 6, which is a verification of employment

from Monroe, indicates that the was seperated from Monroe on
December 6, 1979.
On December 7, 1979, the claimant filed a request to reopen
his claim for unemployment benefits.

On this claim he stated

that his last employer was Gibbons & Reed.

The claimant also

filed a claim for the week ending December 8, 1979, on which he
did not disclose that he had worked during that week.
The claimant received 18 weekly benefit payments in the
amount of $89.00 each for a total of $1,602.
POINT l
THE APPEALS REFEREE DID NOT MAKE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE
ISSUE OF HOW MUCH OF THE AMOUNT RECEIVED BY THE CLAIMANT WAS
RECEIVED BY REASON OF HIS FAILURE TO REPORT A MATERIAL FACT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THIS ISSUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION.
Section 35-4-5 (e) provides that " ... each individual founc

1

in violation of this subsection shall pay to the commission twice!
the amount received by reason of the false representation or
statement or failure to report a material fact."
Thus, in order to assess the claimant twice the
amount that he received the appeals referee should have found
first,

that he failed to report a material fact,

and second, that

received all 18 payments because of that failure to report a
material fact.

The appeals referee made no finding of fact on

the latter issue.
Since the appeals referee made no finding of fact on the
issue of much of the amount received by the claimant was received
by reason of the failure to report a material fact we are left
to speculate at his reason for holding that claimant was overpaid
by an amount equal to twice the amount actually paid to him.
surnably, however, the appeals referee reasoned:

I
I

Pre-

(1) that the

claimant voluntarily left his employment with Monroe;

(2) that

therefore the claimant was ineligible for benefits until he
had earned an amount equal to at least six time the amount of his
weekly benefit;

(3) that the claimant did not perform such work;

(4) that thereofre all of the payments made to the claimant
were the result of his failure to provide material information.
4
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I
!

The problem with this logic is that a person who
voluntarily leaves his employment without good cause is not
automatically disqualified for any given length of time.

He

is disqualified only until he "performs work in bona fide
covered services and earned wages for such services equal
to at least six time the claimants weekly benefit amount."
(Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953).

Thus if

section 35-4-5(e) and Section 35-4-5(a) are to be read together
there and if there is no definite period of disqualification
provided by Section 35-4-5(a) there is obviously an area
where

judicial discretion could be and should be exercised.

This is especially true since Section 35-4-5(a) displays
an obvious concern for the equities of the individual situation.

The section provides: "The conunission shall ••• consider

for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimants actions and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching
a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is
contrarv to eguity and good conscience."

(Emphasis added).

THus section 35-4-5(E) is very different from Section 35-4-6(d)
which is the section considered in Decker v. Industrial Commission, 533 P.2d 898 (1975)

and Diprizio v. Industrial Connni-

ssion, 572 p. 2d 679 (1977).
POINT II
IF SECTION 35-4-5(e), UCA PROVIDES THAT NAY PERSON WHO
VOLUNTARILY LEAVES WORK WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITHHOLDS THAT INFORMATION FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MUST AUTOMATICALLY REPAY THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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II
I
COMMISSION AN AMOUNT TWICE THAT RECEIVED BY THE PERSON DUR
HIS TERM OF UNEMPLOYMENT THAT SECTION WOULD THEN VIOLATE

INr.

I
I

CLP

··1

ANTS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION.

I

It is well established that any legislative act which

I
I

makes a classification of disclassification which is rational:,
related to a legitimate governmental purpose satisfies the
exigencies of equal protection.

The question here, however, :.

whether the legislature singled out fraud concerning the
reason for a persons leaving work where the person left work
without good cause for a much harsher punishment than any
other type of fraud,

and, i f so, why.

In the instant case, for example, i f the

"l

heariog
found that the claimant had good cause to leave work the pena;:
would have been substantially ·1ess harsh.

At most he would h:c

had to repay the cornrnission the amount that he actually recer:·
plus $89. 00.

Why should a harsh penalty hang not on the

nat~·

of the fraud cornrnitted but on the decision as to whether the
claimant left work without cause.
Or consider the hypothetical situtaion where the
claimant leaves work without cause, fails to report that
material fact to the cornrnission and obtains unemployment bene'
fits,

obtains another job without reporting his work or earni:

and continues to collect benefits.

His fraud would obviously

greater that that cornrnitted in the present case but because
he "performed work, work in a bona fide covered service and
earned wages for such services

equal to at least six times

t:I

claimants weekly benefit amoutn" he would have purged the dis·
I

qualification under Section 35-4- 5 ( a } an d t h ere f ore be subjeC Ii
6 by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to a lesser panalty than he had simply collected benfits without
obtaining a job.
It would seem unlikely that the legislature intended
to impose such a harsh and arbitrary punishment on this one type
of fraud, that of obtaining benefits by fraud as to the claimant's
leaving work where the cliarnant left work without cuase, and if the
legislature did so intend that provision clearly violates the claimant's right to equal protection.
POINT III
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT THE CLAIMANT LEFT WORK WITHOUT
GOOD CAUSE.
The facts show that the claimant walked off the
job with Monroe after a dispute with his supervisor about whether
he should be allowed to leave early to go Christmas shopping.
The claimant testified that after cooling off he called reconsidered
his action and called his supervisor the next morning and asked
him whether he wanted him to come for work and was told, "No you
walked off the job."
In a simial case, Powers v. Chizek, 285 N.W. 2d501
(Neb. 1979) the claimant walked off her job before the end of her
shift after a dispute with her supervisor and failed to report for
her next shift both without good cause.

The court held that this

did not contitute leaving work voluntarily" within

the Unemploy-

ment Security Law."
The language of the Nebraska statute is very similar
to the language in the Utah statute.
7
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Also in Sevastino v. State Board of Review, 240A21
172 (NJ,

1968)

an employee walked off the job after he got into a

dispute with another employee.

When he returned to work the next

morning, he found that he had been replaced.

The court remanded

the matter for a hearing on the matter of whether claimant quit
or was voluntarily discharged.

In doing so, the Court said:

"It seems plain . . . that the legislature, in adopting the language
'has left work'

in the disqualifications section .

.

. was undoubted!:!

mindful of a distinction between quitting employment and being
discharged.

Employees frequently leave work temporarily for

some fleeting mental irritation or 'in a huff' occasioned byrne
or more of the furstations attending commercial life,without
intending to quit.

Although such an individual may be said to

have left work voluntarily and without cause attributable to work,
thus angageing in conduct which might justify a discharge by the
employer, nevertheless, such a party may not be said to have' left
work' in the meaning of having severed his employment with an inte:.:
not to return.
In the present case, the referee found that the clairr:":
quit work on December 5,

1979, but he used the term quit work in

the sense of "left work" without any finding as to whether the
claimant intended to sever the employment relationship.

The claim·

statements clearly indicate that he wanted to return to work the

[

1

next day but was told not to do so.

Also Exhibit 5 and 6 indicate that claimant worked on·.
11
cember 3, 4 and 5, 1979 and that he was separated on December 6,

1

because he "quit".

I

The fact that he is listed as having quit the

· t
that he was
day after he walked off the job would seem to indica e

i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT TY
IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIMANT LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT
GOOD CAUSE THE APPEALS REFEREE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE WHETHER THE
CLAIMANTS ACTIONS EVIDENCED A GENUINE ATTACHMENT TO THE LABOR
MARKET: AND IN FACT THE CLAIMANTS ACTIONS EVIDENCED

GENUINE ATTACHEMNT

TO THE LABOR MARKET.
Section 35-4-5{a) states "The commission shall consider • • •
for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachemtn to the labor market in reaching a determination of
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good
conscience.
The appeals referee clearly considered only the reasonableness of
claimants actions in leaving the job at Monroe.

He states that:

"The claimant has not shown that the circumstances were so compelling
as to leave no alternative but to risk a long period of unemployment
by leaving work without notice of without prospects of other work."
Section 35-4-5(a), however, clearly requires that the referee consider the genuineness of the claimants attachment to the job market.
This provision is obviously aimed at protecting the diligent job
seeker who, upon finding himself without a job, goes out and gets
a job that doesn't work out.

It would be extremely unfair to tell

this person that he could quit that job, after finding that he made
a mistake to take it in the first place, only at the risk of losing
his eligibiltiy for unemployemnt benefits.

Also such a policy would

tend to discourage people from taking a job.
In the present case, the referee should have considered the
claimant's past record of promptly obtaining employment when he found
himself without a job and the relative shortness of his term of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
employment withLibrary
Monroe.
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I

This is especially true in view of the harshness of this penalty, I
Record shows that the claimant filed his original ck'
for benefits in May 18, 1979, but that he found a job before he
received any benefits; and that after losing his job with Gibbons
and Reed He obtained a job with Monroe within three days.

rt

also shows that he worked for Monroe for the relatively short penc'
of six weeks.
In view of these facts, the claimants record indicated a genuine attachment to the labor market even if his action
in leaving his job at Monroe was not "reasonable."
POINT V
THE FACTS IN THE RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT THE APPEALS
REFEREES FINDING THAT THE CLAIMANT KNOWINGLY WITHELD MATERIAL
INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS VOLUNTARILY LEAVING AT MONROC.
The fact in the reocrd show only that the claimant
knowingly withheld the information that he had been employed by
Monroe.

There is nothe in the record that indicates that any ques-

tions were asked of the claimant concerning the reasons for
his quitting Monroe or that he withheld information on that issue.
The referee seems to have based his decisions on
this issue on the alleged fact that the Unemployment Insurance
Handbook explained that unemployment benefits may be denied to
a claimant hwo voluntarily left work without good cause.

This

document was not introduced into evidence; the claimant received
it 6 months prior to the time that he filed the claim; he testified that he did not read it; and bhe mere fact that a person
might lose his unemployment benefits if he leaves work voluntarilY
does not without more, necessarity inform a person that he must

10
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disclose the circumstances of his leaving work.
CONCLUSION
The appeals referee erred in holding (1) that the claimant
voluntarily left work without good cause;

(2) that claimant

knowingly withheld information concerning the circumstances of his
leaving his employment at Monroe;

(3) That person who leaves work

without cause an~ withholds that information from the commission
must automatically repay the commission a sum equal to twice the
amount paid to the claimant.

The Court should reduce the amount

of overpayment to $1602.00 which is the amount actually paid to claimant plus $89.00 which is the amount obtainedbythe fraud concerning his
earnings during the week ending December 8, 1979.

In the alterna-

tive this matter should be remanded for additional findings of
fact with instructions to:

(1)

Consider the claimants work record

and the length of his employment with Monroe and the questions of
whether he intended to sever his employment with Monroe when he
walked off the job in deterrning whether he left his employment
without cause and (2) that the appeals referee should exercise judicial
discretion and consider whether the penalty to be assessed would be
inequitable and contrary to good consience in determining what
amount of the benefits paid to the claimant were obtained by fraud.
DATED this 17th day of June, 1981.

Respectfully submitted,

"RAY S. STODDARD

1600 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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1981, to their office.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARK T. HAYWOOD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17372

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section
35-4-10( i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of the
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which affirmed the decision of an
Appeal Referee which denied benefits to the Plaintiff, (hereinafter referred to as claimant),
effective December 2, 1979, and continuing until he has earned wages equal to six times his
weekly benefit amount, pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended (1979 Pocket Supplement), on the grounds the claimant voluntarily left work without
good cause; and also denied benefits to the claimant for the weeks ended December 8, 1979,
through April 5, 1980, and for 49 additional weeks beginning May 25, 1980, and ending May 2,
1981, pursuant to Section 35-4-5(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (1979 Pocket
Supplement), on the grounds the claimant knowingly withheld material information with
regard to work and earnings and voluntarily quit to receive benefits to which he was not
entitled.
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DISPOSITION BELOW
The claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and assessed an
overpayment of $3,204.00 pursuant to Sections 35-4-5(a) and 35-4-5(e), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, (1979 Pocket Supplement), by decision of a Department Representative,
dated May 21, 1980. Claimant appealed the decision which was affirmed by an Appeal Referee
in decision no. 80-A-2081, dated August 21, 1980. Upon further appeal the decision of the
Appeal Referee was affirmed by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah in
case no. 80-A-2081, 80-BR-264, dated September 25, 1980, and issued October 7, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Claimant seeks reduction of the overpayment affirmed by the Board of Review
from $3,204 to $1,691 or, in the alternative, remand to the Appeal Referee to make additional
findings of fact. Defendant seeks affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although there are minor inaccuracies in claimant's Statement of Facts, it is substantially
correct as to the pertinent facts of his work and earnings with and separation from Monroe.
It should be noted that the claimant did not file for or receive unemployment benefits while
working for Gibbons and Reed from June 4, 1979, to October 19, 1979, nor while working for
Monroe from October 22, 1979, until his last week of employment at Monroe. (R.00006, 00012,
00013) However, during his last week of employment, the week ended December 8, 1979, the
claimant worked three days, December 3, 4, and 5, and earned $183.30. R.00033

He separated

under the circumstances outlined in Plaintiff's Brief, Statement of Facts, page3. When claimant
sought to reopen his clalm for benefits during the week ended December 8, 1979, he failed to
report his work and earnings for that week or that he had worked at all for Monroe. Plaintiff's
Brief, page 3, R.00012, 00019. Claimant also failed to report his earnings of $183.30 on his claim
for the week ended December 8, 1979; indeed, he certified "None" on the claim form in the
place where it calls for Total Gross Earnings. R.00035 He also certified that he had not refused
work during the week. R.00035
2 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT

POINTI
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL
COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established. Section
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part:
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the
jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law.
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the Board
of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25
U.2d 131,477 P.2d587 (1970). A reversal of an order of the Department denying compensation
can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the
facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the Department's denial was
clearly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v.
Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d987 (1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 U.
2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966). This Court stated in Members oflron Workers Union of Provo v.
Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 248; 139 P. 2d 208, 211, (1943), that:
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the findings and decision of the
Industrial Commission, this Court may not set aside the decision even though on a
review of the record we might well have reached a different result
This Court has adhered to the same standard of review in cases involving violation of
Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act. Decker v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, Department of Employment Security, Utah, 533 P. 2d 898 (1975); Whitcome v.
Department of Employment Security, Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 564 P. 2d 1116
(1977).
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POINT II
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE CLAIMANT
INTENTIONALLY WITHHELD INFORMATION OF HIS WORK AND EARNINGS FOR
THE WEEK ENDED DECEMBER 8, 1979, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO
WHICH HE WAS NOT ENTITLED.
Section 35-4-5(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (1979 Pocket Supplement)
provides as follows:
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a
waiting period:
(e) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a false
statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain any
benefit under the provisions of this act, and an additional 13 weeks for the last week
the statement or representation was made or fact withheld and six weeks for each
week thereafter; such additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. The additional period
shall commence on the Sunday following the issuance of a determination finding the
claimant in violation of this subsection. In addition, each individual found in violation
of this subsection shall pay to the commission twice the amount received by reason of
the false represnetation or statement or failure to report a material fact. This amount
shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the manner provided in section 34-4-17
(c) and (e). A claimant shall be ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if
any amount owed under this subsection remains unpaid. One-half of the amount
recovered in each case shall be repaid to the unemployment compensation fund,
pursuant to section 35-6-5 (d), and the balance shall be regarded as any other penalty
under this act.
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon a sworn written
admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hearing. If a claimant
waives the recorded hearing a determination shall be made based upon all the facts
which the commission, exercising due diligence, has obained. Determinations by the
commission shall be appealable in the manner provided by this act for appeals from
other benefit determinations.
The evidence of record in this matter is clear and convincing. The claimant worked at least
two days (R.00021) and earned $183.30 (R.00033) during the week ended December 8, 1979.
Despite the knowledge of his work and earnings claimant certified on his claim for that week
that his total gross earnings were "None." R.00035 Claimant's testimony at R.00020 that he
thought he was filling out a claim for the following week is clearly without merit in view of the
week-ending date prominently displayed on the claim card and also the fact that he signed the
claim prior to the conclusion of the following week. R.00035 This Court has previously stated
that intention to defraud is inherent in the claim itself when such claim contains false
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statements and fails to set forth material information required by statute.Martinez v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 576 P. 2d 1295 (1978). The filing of such a claim is in and of itself a

manifestation of intent to defraud. Mineer v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, Utah, 572 P. 2d 1364 (1977). The claimant offered no other explanation for his false claim;

however, the record shows the claimant to have been evasive whenever the Appeal Referee
inquired into the claimant's understanding of his responsibilities when filing for unemployment
insurance benefits. (See R. 00019, 00020, 00021, 00025, 00026)
Claimant apparently does not dispute the finding of fraud with respect to his failure to
report work and earnings for the week ended December 8, 1979. (See Plaintiff's Brief, pages 2
and 11 ). The issues thus before the Court are: (1) did the claimant voluntarily quit work without
good cause under the terms of Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1979 Pocket
Supplement); and, (2) if so, did the claimant intentionally withhold the material information of
his quit in order to obtain unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled.

POINT Ill
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT VOLUNTARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.
Claimant contends that he did not intend to quit his job, but rather, that he walked off the
jobsite, after working a full eight hours, because of a dispute with his supervisor, intending to
return to work the next day. Plaintiff's Brief, page 7, R. 00009, 00010, 00024. However, the
decision of the Commission that claimant voluntarily quit his job is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. At several points in the hearing before the Appeal Referee claimant
referred to his termination as a quit:
Referee:

And they also reported that you earned during the week of
December 2nd to the 8th of '79 a $183.30. Did you work for Monroe
during the week of December 2nd to the 8th of '79?

Mr. Haywood:

Well, I worked for them, but I don't know when-I don't know when
I quit. R.00018

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for5digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Referee:

Well, I don't have the answer. What I'm asking you, really; if you
feel like it's faulty, I would do that. If you agree that this is correct,
I'll just-

Mr. Haywood:

Well, I-the thing is, it's been so long ago, I don't even remember
exactly when I quit. I know it was right before Christmas. R.00019

Mr. Haywood:

Well, I think that's wrong, because I remember going to work
Monday-on a Monday, and I think it was-okay, Monday-let's
see-no, it was a Tuesday, and I was upset, so I called-I left the
job is what I did. I got mad and I left the job.

Referee:

Did you give them notice that you were quitting?

Mr. Haywood:

No, they don't give me notice that they are going to fire me.

Referee:

Okay. I'm just suggesting-

Mr. Haywood:

No, I didn't give them notice. See, it was a-I'd had personal
conflict with the boss there, and there was a lot of things that were
happening on that job that I didn't-well, it wasn't the way he ran it,
it was just that the job was very unsafe, and just one day I was
thinking about it, and I had words with him and he just wouldn't
talk to me, so I just got in my car and left. R.000021

The claimant's testimony that he quit his job is also supported by the claimant's appeal to
the Board of Review wherein he stated:
I testified that I left Monroe becaues the job was unsafe. I also testified how the
foreman was only interested in getting the job done no matter how many safety
precautions that he might elect to overlook. The events the night that I left were the
last draw as far as that Job was concemed.(Emphasis added.) R.00009, 00010

The events of that night, when the claimant left work, were explained by him to the Appeal
Referee in the following manner:
Referee:

I mean, what happened-did you walk off the job? Did you tell
them you were quitting? What happened?

Mr. Haywood:

Oh, no. Not then, no. It wasn't until later. It wasn't until several days
later. And I want to ask him-I think what I wanted to do that night
was to go shopping, Christmas shopping, or something. And, you
know-well, he said, 'I got to pour this one bed.'

8
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You know, and they wasn't going to pour for about three hours.
They had plenty of people, and he just, you know, he didn't stand
there and explain to me or nothing. He just said, 'No, you got to
pour the bed,' and he turned around and walked off ...
Referee:

Okay. What happened to cause you to quit your job?

Mr. Haywood:

Well, I just-when he did that-when he told me, you know, 'you
got to pour that bed,' and it was about 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, and I just-everything hit me at once,•nd I decided that
the Job wasn't worth It. It wasn't worth the problems they were
having, you know, with doing things in a haphazard manner and
putting up with a man who didn't care about nobody but himself.
(Emphasis added) R.00023, 00024

In the face of such evidence the Appeal Referee and Board of Review correctly rejected the
claimant's later self-serving testimony (R.00024) and subsequent contention (Plaintiff's Brief,
pages 7-8) that he did not intend to quit.
Claimant refers in his Brief to two cases from other jurisdictions concerning voluntary
quits: Powers v. Chizel, 204 Neb. 759, 285 N. W. 2d501 (1979); and Savastano v. State Board of
Review, 99 N. J. Super. 397, 240 A. 2d 172 ( 1968). Defendant agrees with the principle for which

these cases stand: that an employee who leaves work temporarily for some fleeting physical or
mental irritation may not intend to sever his employment relationship. The Nebraska Supreme
Court in Powers stated that there must be additional evidence indicating the claimant's intent
to quit before a disqualification would be in order when a claimant simply walks off the job. 285

N. W. 2d, at page 504. Although the facts cited by the Court in Powers suggest that the
conclusion of the Court was erroneous, it is apparent from the record in the instant case that
such additional evidence is ample, as already recited herein. Claimant's contention that his
Phone call to the employer the next day evidences his lack of intent to quit is without merit. Had
the claimant intended to return to work, it is logical that he would have reported on the jobsite at
starting time rather than merely calling.
The claimant's specific testimony concerning his intent, although basically vague and
evasive, suggests that he later changed his mind after walking off the job.
7
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Referee:

When you left the job that evening, were you under the impression
that you quit your job?

Mr. Haywood:

No. I don't know what was going through my mind. All I know 11
that 10:00or11:00 o'clock that night, I 1terted thinking, you know,
that I did-because I we1 med ... (Emphasis added) R.00024

Although the above obviously self-serving testimony implies that the claimant did not intend to
sever his employment relationship, it is inconsistent with claimant's many statements that he
quit or that he decided" ... the job wasn't worth it." In view of the entire record in this matter the
commission properly concluded that the claimant quit his job.
One final matter concerning the claimant's quit requires comment. Although the claimant
testified he quit because of alleged unsafe working conditions, there is no evidence that he
made any attempt to have management correct the problems or that he reported the problems
to OSHA. This Court has previously held that an employee with grievances must indicate an
effort to work out the problems of which he complains, unless he can demonstrate that such
efforts would be futile. Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah,
567 P. 2d 626 (1977)

POINT IV
THE CLAIMANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS BASED ON CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
Claimant contends that even if his action in leaving work at Monroe was not "reasonable,"
the Appeal Referee should have considered the evidence of the claimant's genuine attachment
to the labor market. Plaintiff's Brief, page 10.
In considering whether a denial of benefits would be contrary to equity and good
conscience, the legislature provided three guidelines: (1) that the allowance of benefits in such
cases would be consistent with the purposes of the Employment Security Act; (2) that the
claimant's decision to quit work was reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) that the
claimant's actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market. By use of the
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word "and," it appears that the legislature intended these three requirements to be read in the
conjunctive, for only by so doing can both purposes of unemployment insurance be
adequately met.
It is apparent from the fact that the legislature did not eliminate the "at fault" concept In
unemployment cases, that the legislature must have intended a melding or blending of that
concept with the purpose of maintaining purchasing power in the community when an
individual becomes unemployed by reason of a voluntary quit, but under circumstances that
demonstrate the reasonableness of the claimant's decision to quit and also his genuine
continuing attachment to the labor market. This exception to the disqualification, however,
should not be construed too broadly so as to do damage to the long-standing principle that the
claimant's actions must be motivated by circumstances or conditions beyond his control. The
interpretation of "equity and good conscience" should be consistent with the requirement that
the unemployment be "caused by external pressures" such as would motivate "a reasonably
prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence," to quit work. Denby v.
Board of Review, Supra. To our knowledge, no other state has attempted to redefine the

voluntary quit disqualification in this manner.
The claimant's action in quitting work was not reasonable, as evidenced by his own
admission that after thinking it over, he called the employer the next day and asked if the
employer wanted him to report to work. R.00024 Further, the claimant made no effort to
resolve his differences with the employer prior to quitting. Therefore, claimant has failed to
show that his quit was motivated by circumstances or conditions beyond his control. Such
being the case. the claimant has not met all of the requirements established by the legislature
for application of the principle of equity and good conscience.

POINT V
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE CLAIMANT
KNOWINGLY WITHHELD THE MATERIAL INFORMATION OF HIS VOLUNTARY
QUIT, AND THE DECISION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
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The claimant alleges there is nothing in the record that indicates any questions were asked
of him concerning the reasons he quit Monroe. The reason no questions concerning Monroe
were asked when the claimant reopened his claim is obvious-he had concealed the fact of his
employment and subsequent voluntary quit by not reporting that information to the Department of Employment Security when he filed his request for reopening. R.00012, 00019
The claimant's explanation to the Appeal Referee of why he did not report his employment
with Monroe was very vague and ambiguous:
Referee:

Was there any reason why you didn't list Monroe on that when you
reopened your claim?

Mr. Haywood:

I don't know why I didn't.

Referee:

Did you understand when you signed this certification that you
were certifying that all the information on the form was correct?

Mr. Haywood:

Well, all I know is that I had a blue slip from Mon-from Gibbons &
Reed.

Referee:

Uh, huh.

Mr. Haywood:

And, to tell you the truth, I don't-I wasn't really up to-you
know-aware of all the rules and regulations. I never-well, okay, I
had a blue slip from Snowbird, and I can't remember-I know I had
to wait awhile, you know, to get the unemployment benefits, but I
don't-I wasn't aware that, you know-I mean, you have a blue slip
that says you were laid off, but I don't know why I didn't put-I
should have put Monroe down there. R.00019

The claimant further testified that he didn't read the form he was asked to fill out when he
reopened his claim.
Referee:

Okay. Did you know mat when you filled Ou'. this torm tl"1at tne form
was asking you w list all the 1obs you haa 11ad since you filed last?

Mr. Haywood:

I probably didn't read it. Because if 1 had read it, I would have put 1t
down.

The claimant's testimony that he filled out a lorm without reading 1t is incredible. At the
very least, it shows a conscious disregard for his responsibil1t1es when filing for unemp1oyment
benefits.
10
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With respect to the claimant's contention that the Appeal Referee failed to make a specific
finding of fact as to how much of the overpayment was attributable to the claimant's fraud, it
should be noted that the primary reason for requiring findings of fact in administrative
proceedings is to facilitate judicial review. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 455;
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Volume 2, Section 16.02. An examination of the Referee's
decision shows that he considered all of the weeks for which the claimant filed claims after
leaving Monroe to have been fraudulent. This conclusion is evident from the fact that the
Appeal Referee assessed the administrative penalty provided in Section 5(e) of the Act to all
such weeks.
Claimant further contends that the assessment of fraud for all weeks claimed after a
voluntary quit, when a claimant fails to report the quit, is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. In support of this contention the claimant argues that the harshness
of the penalty hangs on whether or not the claimant quit without good cause ratherthan on the
nature of the fraud. Such is simply not the case.
Section 5(e) of the Act, as quoted in Point II hereof, provides that a claimant will be
disqualified for each week with respect to which he fails to report material information. For that
reason all claimants are required to report their last employment and reason for separation
therefrom. When such information is reported the issue is adjudicated. If it is determined that
the claimant quit without good cause, he is disqualified from receiving benefits until he earns
six times his weekly benefit amount in other employment. When a claimant conceals this
information and is found eligible for benefits, he receives such benefits by reason of his failure
to report material information. A claimant who fails to report his employment and separation,
thinking he had good cause for quitting, cannot later avail himself of the defense of simple
mistake when he intentionally precluded the Department from making a proper adjudication of
the issue by reason of his concealment.
In the instant case the claimant received benefits for 18 weeks, for which he would have
been ineligible had he not fraudulently concealed the reason for his unemployment. The 5(e)
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penalty is not assessed because the claimant quit work without good cause, but rather,
because he intentionally withheld that information and thereby received benefits to which he
was not entitled.
The claimant's hypothetical situation wherein an individual quits work without good cause
and later obtains new work, without reporting either the quit or the new work, is of no value In
the Instant matter. Although the hypothetical claimant may purge the dlsquallflcation for
voluntarily quitting, his failure to report the new work while drawing benefits is itself a
fraudulent act which would subject him to the penalty provided in Section S(e).
The significance of this issue is that in most cases of fraud covering several weeks, there is
an act or omission each week, such as in failing to report work and earnings. However, a
claimant is required to report a voluntary quit only once, that is when he opens or reopens his
claim for benefits. Each week of benefits received by a claimant after a failure to report his quit
is directly attributable to his original fraudulent act, and therefore, the fraudulent act is with

reapect to each such week.
Defendants concede that an overpayment of $3,204 may be a harsh penalty. However, it is
consistent with the plain meaning of the words in Section S(e), is directly related to the purpose
of Section S(e) to encourage honesty in reporting, Millet v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 609 P.
2d 946, 948 (1980), and does not operate in a discriminatory manner toward any individual.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in the instant case is clear and convincing that the claimant knowingly
withheld material information of his work and earnings for the week ended December 8, 1979,
and his voluntary quit that same week in order to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled.
The decision of the Board of Review should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this ____ day of July, 1981.

DAVID L. WILKINSON,
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

K. Allan Zabel
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